“No Comparable Period of Activity”: Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron FIFTEEN’s Actions After Operation Avalanche

 
Author’s Note: During this 80^th anniversary cycle of World War II, I hope to correct, at least in some small way through multiple weblog posts, the incomplete historical scholarship given to the U.S. Navy’s missions and activities in the European and Mediterranean Theaters of Operation, compared with those in the Pacific Theater. By utilizing little known records in collections of the NHHC’s Archives Branch, the stories of the men that lived, served, and fought aboard ships will be honored––while simultaneously allowing the reader to gain a better insight into the richness, breadth, and depth of our textual holdings. Hopefully these entries will ignite a spark of desire to conduct historical research here at the Navy’s official archives, using the same collections I cite as documentary evidence.
         
After the successful end to Operation Husky, the Allies next objective was an invasion of the Italian mainland. Eighty years ago on 9 September 1943, the American and British armies under the 15^th Army Group launched Operation Avalanche. Unfortunately, the landings on the beaches in the Gulf of Salerno did not happen as rapidly as planners imagined. The U.S. 5^th Army struggled to establish itself quickly ashore. By 13 September, the Germans quickly recovered from their confusion and counterattacked in force, driving almost onto the beaches themselves. However, heavy naval gunfire support from American and British warships stopped their advance. On 18 September, the Germans began their withdrawal, allowing Allied forces to finally push inland. The vital deep-water port of Naples was captured in early October, and by the sixth, Operation Avalanche was declared a success.[1]

As the Allies then continued their slow march northward in the face of entrenched German resistance, the Sailors of the U.S. 8^th Fleet/Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters––under the command of then-VADM Henry K. Hewitt, USN––fought to keep German Kriegsmarine units at bay. This was essential to maintaining and expanding Allied control of the Mediterranean Sea. Keeping it clear would allow future amphibious assaults to succeed, while also enabling the free flow of communication and supply. One particular unit of the 8^th Fleet––Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron FIFTEEN (MTBRON-15), led by then-LCDR Stanley M. Barnes, USN––was “the PT unit with the most distinguished service record in Europe.”[2] This unit’s post- Avalanche operations will highlight some of their accomplishments in 1943 that led to this honorific in a still-overlooked theater of war.

MTBRON-15 was established in April 1943 and disestablished in October 1944. Perhaps the best overview of the unit’s seventeen-month history is summarized by text typed onto two three-by-five-inch index cards in the Archives Branch’s Awards Card Collection. As stated on the cards for the unit’s recommended Presidential Unit Citation (PUC)––the highest honor an Armed Forces unit can receive––the squadron’s boats
   
If these individual feats were not impressive enough, the men of MTBRON-15 cooperated collectively by patrolling with the British Royal Navy’s Coastal Forces in the western Mediterranean. These combined operations led to serious disruptions in German coastal traffic.[4]

The many missions that MTBRON-15’s Sailors undertook, as described above, were performed in the motor torpedo (PT) boat. First designed and built by the Royal Navy in 1875, the modern American PT came into existence after America entered World War II. As described in the six-page transcribed article titled “Duty Done––PT’s Retire” from the March 1946 issue of ALL HANDS: The Bureau of Naval Personnel Information, PTs were considered “expendable.”[5] Their primary mission was offensive in nature, striking at enemy ships by “mov[ing] in close, let[ting] go their torpedoes . . . and turn[ing] away.”[6] One of the most vibrant descriptions of PT boats is found in this six-page document. The author begins by posing a question: “what manner of vessels are these mighty midgets that can take on several hundred times their weight in enemy warships?” He answers by writing:
   
There is no doubt, then, that the men of MTBRON-15 had the right type of weapon to bring the war close to the Germans. They were utilized to great effect in a series of little-known actions in November 1943.

The first major action occurred in the early morning hours of 3 November. PTs 207 and 211, under the command of LT R. H. O’Brien, USN, departed La Maddalena, Sardinia to patrol the Italian coast between the islands of Elba and Giglio. Their mission, as assigned by their immediate operational superior in command––British Commander Advanced Coast Forces––was to locate and disrupt German shipping traffic. At 0035 the torpedomen made radar contact with a large target near Giglio’s north shore. Upon closing, the target was determined to be a medium-sized tanker of 4,000 tons, escorted by three German “S” or “R” boats.[8]

Soon an attack against the tanker commenced. At 0125, six torpedoes were fired from the Americans: four from PT 211 and two from PT 207. As both boats turned away, German sailors opened fire from the tanker with a large caliber gun and several machine guns. The “S” or “R” boat sailors quickly joined the firefight with their 20mm and 40mm guns. The PT boats laid down a smokescreen and increased their speed to turn away.[9] As they did so, “one torpedo hit was observed at the tanker’s bow. A few seconds later another hit amidships which caused an explosion. This was quickly followed by another which precipitated a violent explosion sending flames 150 feet into the air. The entire superstructure of the tanker was thrown bodily into the air and it sank within a few seconds. The explosion was of such force that the PTs were severly (sic) shaken at 800 yards. The escort ceased firing at this time.”[10]

However, unbeknownst to the Sailors aboard PT 207, just before firing ceased an incendiary 20mm bullet passed through its “starboard forward gas tank and the ammunition locker in the officers’ quarters, coming to rest on the transom.” Gas subsequently “flowed from the tank through the bullet hole in the after bulkhead of the officers’ quarters into the bilges of the officers’ quarters. Some clothing hanging in the quarters was set smoldering and apparently initiated the explosion that followed when the gas vapor concentration reached an explosive mixture.”[11] This chain of events quickly led to a fire in the quarters. It would have spread to the entire boat if not for the quick thinking and action of a few individual Sailors. Upon seeing the flames, one man initiated the tank compartment CO₂ solution. RM2c E. B. Farley, USNR, immediately retrieved a fire extinguisher from the chart house, pulled the pin, and sprayed the fire with CO₂ solution. Another Sailor closed the below-deck hatch, and soon the fire was smothered. A preventative measure, securely closing or ‘dogging down’ all other hatches prior to the battle, probably contributed to the fire remaining where it was. If the men in PT 207 thought they were fighting this fire alone, they were mistaken––for upon seeing the flames, PT 211 raced to the scene, laying down a smokescreen across the damaged boat’s path to conceal her withdrawal. Thankfully there were no casualties, and both boats made it safely into La Maddalena harbor at 0600.[12] A hand-drawn sketch of this action, possibly done by LCDR Barnes and included with his formal report––albeit somewhat unusual––nicely illustrates this story.
           
This type of teamwork, initiative, and quick thinking was not confined to the 3 November action; it was a constant theme throughout MTBRON-15’s existence. So was their vigorous operational tempo, as stated in the recommend PUC text. One week later, on the morning of 11 November off Giglio Island, PT 209, operating with three British PT boats, attacked another large tanker, this time without success. The two German escorts, again either of the “S” or “R” type, opened fire on the Allies. They, in turn, closed to within a distance of 1,500 yards of the Germans, and PT 209 then fired four torpedoes. None were seen hitting their mark. Soon the enemy’s fire was so intense and accurate that the Allies broke away. Two Sailors aboard PT 209 were wounded in this engagement––one manned the starboard twin .50 caliber machine gun turret. A bullet of unknown caliber hit the machine gun at eye-level but deflected downwards, causing serious injury to his right hand and leg. If it were not for the kapok life vest he was wearing, the bullet may have penetrated into his stomach, potentially causing a fatal wound. Unfortunately, the fate of this unidentified Sailor is unknown.[13]

The second major action occurred on 29–30 November, after a small engagement with another German tanker a week earlier off Leghorn. At 1900 on the twenty-ninth, PTs 204 and 211––the same boat involved in the action on 3 November––under the overall command of LT E. A. DuBose, USNR, departed Bastia to patrol the Genoa shoreline. From that time until 2100 the sea and wind was relatively calm.[14] Soon afterwards, the wind increased to a speed of thirty to thirty-five knots with high waves forming. Both PTs radars “were salted out almost immediately” and “since it was nearly impossible to keep in formation, boats were ordered to return to Bastia individually. The complete darkness of the night and heavy seas limited the visibility to about one hundred yards.”[15] At 2230 PT 211 approached Bastia harbor, followed slowly by PT 204.

That same minute, a Sailor fired a two star recognition flare in the air to indicate his boat’s position relative to that of PT 211. Five minutes later, four German “E” or “R” boats appeared off PT 204’s starboard beam at seventy-five yards, steaming on an opposite course. Then, in his typed after action report, LCDR Barnes vividly described what happened next:  
Amazingly, not one Sailor––American or German––was killed or wounded during this hail of hot lead that passed through the darkened Mediterranean sky. The same cannot be written of PT 204, however. Its bow was severely damaged above the water line. The after engine room was riddled with bullet holes, along with the center engine. Surprisingly, it continued to run, allowing PT 204 and her crew to return to Bastia in the early morning of 30 November. As for the German “E” or “R” boat that rammed into PT 204, no sign of it was discovered after the engagement, likely indicating its loss.[17]
           
As the date then changed from 30 November to 1 December, the men of MTBRON-15 undoubtedly had a few days to calm their nerves in Bastia before heading out to sea again. Nineteen forty-four would prove just as eventful for these Sailors, as mentioned in the recommended PUC text. When the unit disbanded in October 1944, the number of men killed in action totaled four, with another twenty-eight wounded in action. Of the squadron’s eighteen PT boats in service, sixteen were damaged during battle and two were sunk. These statistics just add further weight to the claim that “no other Motor Torpedo Squadron of the U.S. Navy has had a comparable period of activity” during the war––which is told by the documentary evidence held in the Navy Archives.[18]